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abstract: In Maryland, fierce debate attended the decision to confiscate loyalist lands, but the state eventually embraced confiscation, seizing significantly more
loyalist land than neighbors who had access to lands in the trans-Appalachian west.
State senators who initially objected to property confiscations found themselves
forced by necessity to adopt a revolutionary view of subjecthood, in which loyalists who abandoned the state voluntarily abrogated their citizenship. While some
irregularity surrounded Maryland’s confiscations, this paled in comparison to the
corruption that attended confiscation in neighboring states like Pennsylvania and
New Jersey. However, as in other confiscations, the state’s political and military officers came to dominate purchases of loyalist land, demonstrating the influence of the
wealthy over Maryland’s political process.
key words: Confiscation, land speculation, revolution, property rights, loyalists

In 1777, with the American Revolutionary War in the balance, the Continental
Congress suggested confiscating loyalist property as a means of raising
money. Although it left the final decision for this measure to the discretion
of the rebelling states, all thirteen passed confiscation legislation targeting
active loyalists who abandoned the state or fought against the patriots. States
varied widely in the amount of land they confiscated. Confiscation met little
real political opposition in Pennsylvania, where the state sold around 40,000
acres of loyalist land beginning in 1778. The state also assumed control over
more than 20 million acres of the Penn family’s proprietary lands, for which
it granted £130,000 in compensation (perhaps a tenth of its true value).
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In Maryland, one of the last states to enact confiscation, the issue became a
political flashpoint, exacerbating pre-existing tensions between politicians in
the House of Delegates who supported confiscation and those in the Senate
who opposed it. Despite starting confiscations as late as 1781, Maryland eventually confiscated more land than Pennsylvania, selling over 200,000 acres
and gaining £450,000 from auctions. Maryland also assumed control over its
proprietor’s inheritance, compensating Henry Harford with £10,000, while
selling his quarter-million acres for nearly £200,000. This put the scale of
confiscations for the relatively small state of Maryland almost on par with
the much larger state of New York, which seized and sold 1 million acres of
loyalist lands.1
The states’ auctions of confiscated property took place within the broader
context of a continent gripped by land mania. Even before the Revolution,
the logic of land investment was plain. In the 1750s Benjamin Franklin
expressed this understanding well when he wrote that land was “plenty in
America, and so cheap as that a laboring Man, that understands Husbandry,
can in a short Time save Money enough to purchase a Piece of new Land sufficient for a Plantation, whereon he may subsist a Family.” These conditions
allowed for early marriages, allowing Franklin to estimate that the colonial
population “must at least be doubled every 20 years.” Despite this burgeoning populace, “so vast is the Territory of North-America, that it will require
many Ages to settle it fully; and till it is fully settled, Labour will never be
cheap here.” As a result, Franklin noted that America could never compete
with England in the production of manufactured goods. Franklin did not
directly spell out the implications for investing wealth in America, but we
can do so: compared to Europe, America’s population density was low, but
the population itself was growing. Therefore, land that was currently cheap
due to a lack of demand would become dear at some point in the future. It
is no accident that Franklin became an avid land speculator, as did most of
his wealthy contemporaries.2
The French and Indian War briefly complicated the logic of America’s
land market. The end of the war eradicated French opposition on the continent, which could have signaled an open frontier for the British. Instead the
government enacted the Proclamation Line in 1763, banning white migration west of the Appalachians to prevent further violence with Indians. Sir
William Johnson renegotiated the line further to the west at the Treaty of
Fort Stanwix in 1768, but the general limitation on western settlement—and
therefore western land speculation—remained. Thus, for the decade leading
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up to the revolution, land east of the Appalachians became more densely
populated, without the ability to release potential migrants to the west.3
The outbreak of the American Revolution changed this dynamic for the
continental land market. The victorious revolutionaries had no qualms about
taking Indian lands and opening the west to settlement, causing a boom in
land speculation to follow on the heels of the war. While the United States
government negotiated with individual states for the rights to the far west,
states like Pennsylvania, New York, and North Carolina sold off much of
their backcountries to speculators. Some speculators, like William Cooper,
amassed great fortunes; others, like Robert Morris and John Nicholson, made
and then lost fortunes, dealing in millions of acres to their own detriment.
For the United States and the financially stretched American states, selling
land in the west held open one of the only real possibilities for avoiding
bankruptcy after a lengthy and very costly war of independence.4
The vast amount of land that entered the market in the aftermath of the
American Revolution offered an opportunity to level social differences, albeit
one that the United States did not pursue. Some, like Thomas Jefferson,
recognized this opportunity and advocated for widespread landownership
as a precondition for a healthy republic, arguing that “dependance begets
subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares
fit tools for the designs of ambition.” Nevertheless, government policies
favored speculators for decades following the revolution, in part due to the
dire need for ready cash. By 1785 the grand speculator George Washington
worried about “Land jobbers” west of the Appalachians “prouling about
like Wolves . . . [injuring] the real occupants & useful citizens; & consequently, the public interest.” By 1789 Virginia’s exasperated attorney general
James Innes wrote, “If Congress think speculators, and land jobbers, of
more de[se]rving favor and reward—than the officers of the late American
Army—be it so—our interests must, I suppose, be yielded.” While Franklin’s
calculations that American land should be cheap held true in the aggregate,
tenancy remained commonplace in many regions. For example, in 1783 half
of the white householders living in Maryland’s Chesapeake counties did not
own their own land and tenancy was common even in the less developed
western portions of the state. Areas that had been devoid of white settlement
prior to the revolution, such as Ohio, could theoretically have seen the widespread distribution of small independent farms. Instead, by 1810 a minority
of the adult male inhabitants owned land, and speculators controlled the
majority of the state’s acres.5
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It is within this larger context of governmental indebtedness and support
for the ambitions of speculators that this article will examine the process
of confiscating British property in Maryland and compare it to the confiscations in Pennsylvania and other nearby states. Like their neighbors,
Marylanders expressed varying levels of uneasiness with the idea of property
confiscation. They debated what confiscation meant for the nature of citizenship and property rights and they worried about the opportunities that
confiscations would provide for unscrupulous war profiteers. Maryland was
slow to endorse confiscation and quick to ban bills of attainder after the war,
but nevertheless acquired a great deal of loyalist land in the final years of
the revolution. In the end, after Maryland embraced confiscation as a wartime expedient, the primary beneficiaries were the men with the wealth to
purchase lands. This class of men included some merchants but contained a
disproportionately large number of the state’s political and military officers.
The debates over confiscation and the unequal distribution of confiscated
lands thus offer a window into revolutionary society, demonstrating how
American elites directed the politics of the country in ways that benefited the
existing landholding class.6

laying the groundwork for confiscation
The American Revolution posed a complicated problem for local elites
throughout the new states. Leaders of the insurrection had to negotiate an
intricate political balance: on one hand, the revolution had to capture the
hearts and minds of the common people, which involved ensuring that they
had political and financial incentives to rebel against British rule. On the
other, revolutionary elites wanted to avoid anarchy and mob rule. Keeping
this balance in mind, Maryland produced a conservative state constitution.
As late as January 1776, the Maryland Convention adopted a statement
embracing the English constitution and the king. However, following the
Declaration of Independence that summer, an electoral struggle ensued
between two factions for control of the Maryland conventions that would
establish a new constitution. Led by Rezin Hammond, the radicals had been
early advocates for independence and had pressed for violent opposition
to British taxation as early as 1774. Aiming for the support of the humble
he called for all taxpayers to vote, regardless of income, for a ban on debt
collection until the end of the military conflict and the restructuring of tax
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collection to be more equitable across all classes. Opposing Hammond was
the peculiarly elitist “popular party,” a more moderate group led by the
wealthy Carroll family and the Annapolis lawyer Samuel Chase. The split
between the two factions developed partially out of personal disagreements
between the Hammonds and Carrolls, who opposed one another in court
battles over the legal title to several hundred acres of land.7
Once at the conventions, the popular party leveraged the threat of loyalist insurrections on the Eastern Shore to call for compromise and patriotic
unity. A raft of changes loosened colonial restrictions on voting but kept
power in the hands of elites. To vote, Maryland’s citizens needed to possess £30 in paper money (equivalent to £20 sterling) or fifty acres of land.
They could not directly vote for the state senators of the upper house, but
instead only chose a body of electors who decided the composition of the
Senate. Similarly, the elected legislators of both the lower and upper houses
of the legislature chose the governor. Strict property requirements still prevented common planters from serving in positions of power: the governor
required £5,000; members of the Senate needed £1,000; members of the
House required £500. To put these numbers in some perspective, Jackson
Turner Main suggested that a typical 289-acre farm on the Eastern Shore in
the late colonial period could only yield £170 per year. This meant that only
substantial planters owning about 1,000 acres could qualify for office under
Maryland’s revolutionary constitution.8
Far from revolutionizing the social structure, these new property requirements recreated a social basis for the government that resembled that of the
colonial period. Charles Barker calculated that in 1755, while the average
landholder owned between 255 and 473 acres, the average lower house delegate held 2,222 acres, and the average upper house delegate held 8,422 acres.
The numbers for delegates’ holdings did not shift significantly in 1771. Over
this same period, David Skaggs surveyed four counties across the colony,
finding the percentage of total landholders in these counties dropped from
44 to 37 percent.9
As a result, while 63.8 percent of white men in Maryland could vote,
access to political office depended on the county. In wealthy Baltimore
County, 27.5 percent of white men met the property requirements to become
legislators. In westernmost Washington County, only 6.2 percent met those
property requirements, and fewer than 2 percent owned enough property to
become senators. As had been the case in Maryland’s colonial period, legislators in the lower house tended to possess more than five times the amount of
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property of the average voter in their district; legislators in the upper house
tended to own between twenty and thirty times as much property as the average voter in their district. This left so few men eligible for the Senate that in
the words of Senator Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, “there will not be men
enough found of sufficient abilities to turn the machine with that velocity
which the present exigencys of our affairs require.” He feared that such an
unrepresentative institution could cause the people to balk whenever the
indirectly elected Senate differed in opinion from the House.10
In 1777, with control of the government vested firmly in the hands of the
wealthy, the popular party next dealt with the fiscal crises menacing the state:
farmers’ debts to merchants and the costly ongoing war effort. The popular
party appeased many voters by passing compromise measures that echoed
Hammond’s proposals. First, the legislature reformed the tax system, abolishing the split colonial system that instituted land and poll taxes in favor of a
graduated property tax. Between 1777 and 1781 the government passed ten
different laws to regulate taxation. These laws attempted to grade the quality
of land, land improvements, and slaves in order to shift a greater tax burden
on the wealthy, but also expanded the tax base to include those who had
previously been considered propertyless.11
Additionally, in 1777 the legislature passed several controversial bills
creating a cheap supply of money. The state printed money to pay its own
debts and allowed Marylanders to pay their taxes in paper money. These
measures temporarily eased the financial difficulties of both the state and
its people. Importantly, the state also mandated that the money printed by
Maryland and the United States must be accepted as legal tender by creditors. This money quickly depreciated, easing the lot of debtors across the
state, strengthening support for the government, and appeasing the common people. The measure obviously hurt elite creditors. Wealthy men began
to feel a sense of foreboding about potential social conflict ignited by the
future effects of inflation, and a rift began to open between the Senate and
the House over the state’s financial profligacy. Ultimately, the debate over
confiscation only worsened the split.12
In part, this was because Maryland experienced relatively little open dissent from loyalists during the Revolutionary War. Indeed, the Western Shore
never saw organized loyalist forces. However, hundreds of loyalists organized
on the Eastern Shore in 1777 and 1778, timing their violence to coincide with
the British campaign against Philadelphia. These forces could not match the
more numerous Maryland patriots, and many loyalists lapsed into neutrality
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after the British withdrawal from Philadelphia. In response to this loyalist
activity, the Maryland legislature demanded an oath of loyalty in 1777, barring anyone who refused to take the oath from serving in the government
and assessing trebled tax rates upon them. Only 18,000 people, or roughly
two-thirds of the eligible adult male population, swore an oath of allegiance
to the revolution. The government made no effort to single out recalcitrant
but inactive Tories for punishments beyond special taxes. Unfortunately for
Maryland’s loyalists, however, Britain made little effort to support them:
their regular soldiers spent virtually no time in Maryland throughout the
war and Maryland’s loyalists proved no match for the more numerous patriot
militia. As a result, even on the Eastern Shore, most Maryland loyalists lapsed
into a grudging neutrality, with outbreaks of violence occurring only sporadically throughout the war.13
Given the lack of British military support, it remains an open question
as to why some Marylanders remained loyal to the crown. Robert Calhoon
suggested that personal ties played a large role in determining whether
Americans remained loyal during the conflict: of the 136 Maryland colonial
officeholders whose allegiance can be determined, two-thirds joined the
revolutionaries. Yet officeholders were three times as likely to remain loyalists than to become patriots if they had received their patronage directly
from one of the colonial governors or through the influence of one of the
major proprietary party families: the Dulanys, the Calverts, or the Claggetts.
Officeholders who had not received personal patronage from these proprietary officials became revolutionaries in overwhelming numbers. On the
Eastern Shore, the rise of evangelical religion, especially Methodism, among
the common people exacerbated a breakdown in social cohesion between
classes. This left the door open for loyalist dissenters. However, by mid-war,
the popular party’s compromise policies had undermined the resentment
between classes, preventing this movement from spreading.14

passing confiscation legislation
In Rhode Island the confiscation of loyalist estates began as early as October
1775. By November 1777 North Carolina, New York, and Massachusetts had
followed suit, and Congress formally suggested that all states begin confiscating British property. In Maryland the dominant figures of the popular party,
Samuel Chase in the House of Delegates and Charles Carroll of Carrollton in
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the Senate, blocked any discussion of confiscation for two years. Only South
Carolina would wait longer than Maryland to eventually pass confiscation
legislation.15
By late 1779 the House of Delegates and the Senate had developed opposing views about Maryland’s financial situation. Many senators believed
that the state had already gone too far to weaken its currency and thereby
threatened property holding in general. Members of the House worried
that the state could no longer fight the war effort without an influx of cash.
For the year 1780, Congress asked Maryland to provide more than $14 million, with the first installment of more than $1.5 million due in February.
The House believed that taxation alone could not raise the money without
impoverishing the populace. As a result, on December 15, 1779, they passed
a bill seizing British estates, estimating that their sales would raise more than
$5 million.16
The Senate rejected the bill five days later, and over the next year the question of confiscation became the most significant debate in Maryland politics.
Carroll drafted the Senate’s initial explanation for its rejection of the bill,
which set the terms of the debate that would follow. Severe weather meant
that half of the senators had already left for the winter, so Carroll asked for
a postponement of the matter, bolstering this delaying effort with a list of
objections to the bill.17
In terms of practical matters, the House had argued that paying its
share of the war effort through taxation alone would result in the people of
Maryland being stripped of 27 percent of their property by the end of 1780.
Carroll disagreed because of the rapid advance of inflation. Depreciation of
the dollar would render the nominal value of all property much higher, so
that people would be able to continue to pay so long as they had tangible
resources. Therefore, the Senate believed fiscal collapse was not imminent,
and that confiscation could therefore be postponed.18
Carroll had further practical objections to confiscation. If the House
wanted to confiscate British property immediately, they would be putting
lands up for sale at the worst time of year, when the winter would impede
buyers from attending auctions. Instead, he predicted that the purchasers would “consist altogether of engrossers and speculators, men who have
acquired great sums for little value, and therefore may afford to run the risk,
whatever it may be, of realizing their money on such easy terms.” Combined
with the ravages of depreciation, “the sum arising from the sales would, we
think, for the reasons already suggested, be very inconsiderable, and far short
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of the real value of the property sold.” Such sales would become a liability if
the United States were to negotiate peace in 1780, because Carroll assumed
that part of that negotiation would require a repayment of the value of confiscated British property.19
Practical matters, however, took secondary importance to the Senate’s
main argument: that Maryland’s constitution forbade confiscation. In
Carroll’s words, “We doubt, whether, by a fair construction of that law [of
nations], the declaration of independence can have such a retrospective
operation, as to vest in this state all British property acquired by individuals
antecedently to it.” Indeed, if British absentees forfeited not only their property, but also their subjecthood to the state when they left, the state’s treason
laws targeting the same people made little sense; how could someone who
was not a subject of Maryland commit treason? Even if there were a constitutional defense to be made for confiscation, “intemperate zeal and intemperate resentments have frequently given fatal stabs to governments as free
as ours. We need not remind you that the rigour of law is often injustice.”
While the Senate’s desire to avoid injustice for British absentees seemed
high-minded and generous, it may not have been selfless. Carroll and other
elite men in the state had significant capital that remained in Britain, tied
up in banks and property. Privately Carroll worried that should the state
confiscate British property, the British would retaliate against Marylanders.
This made it especially important for the wealthy to protect property rights
at all costs.20
Of course, something had to be done to continue the war, and the Senate
agreed that Maryland had its back against the wall financially. Carroll wrote
that the ultimate financial solution lay outside of Maryland:
When the representatives of the United States perceive the impracticability of supporting the war by taxes, and internal loans, only, necessity will force them to adopt a measure, which justice and true policy
dictate, and which had been ere now adopted, if partial interests had
not interfered, and prevented its adoption. By making the back lands
a common stock, and by selling a part of them, millions might in
time be brought into the public treasury, and in the mean while great
sums would probably be advanced on that security; monies may be
borrowed in Europe, and of this we suppose the congress have assurances, by the late notice of their intention to draw bills of exchange
to the amount of £200,000 sterling.
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In Carroll’s reasoning, if Maryland could avoid being too hasty, the other
states would eventually come to their senses and make an agreement on
selling the lands west of the Appalachians. This communal revenue source
would solve the country’s problems without hamstringing Maryland’s future
or threatening the sanctity of property rights. In the meantime, he wrote, “we
are persuaded we shall never receive [the people’s] thanks, if, endeavouring
by expedients to shun small and temporary inconveniences, we bring upon
them much greater future evils.”21
On December 30, 1779, the House of Delegates responded to the Senate’s
missive in frustration, engaging in a point-by-point refutation of Carroll’s
message. They noted the direness of the situation and extensively defended
the righteousness of confiscation, according to natural law and the law of
nations. They doubted that the British would demand compensation for
the confiscated property. With regards to the Senate’s fears that speculators
would snap up most of the property, the House wrote:
We do not think it probable that this will be the case. The objects of
these men are the necessaries of life, and the commodities of foreign
commerce; but, if they should be the purchasers, we cannot help
believing, that it will be desirable; for thereby the money, which is
the means of their speculation, will be drawn out of their hands; and
if, as your honours seem to suppose, “the title may be doubtful, and
the purchase invidious,” engrossers and speculators are the best men
whose hands it can fall into.
The House took a similar sarcastic tone when addressing the idea that
sales of backcountry land could rescue the financial situation. Initially
agreeing with the proposal, the author of the House’s document went on
to opine that:
the back lands cannot be confiscated. If they belong to the native
Indians, your honours will say, that though they have made war
against us, yet their property cannot be confiscated, for Vattell, a late
and celebrated writer on the law of nations, has shewn, “that the rigour of that law is much softened in this very point, by present usage
and practice.” If they belong to the crown of Great Britain, as trustee
for the nation, as we conceive, and will be called British property,
the congress, should they adopt the same way of thinking with your
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honours, will not be willing to confiscate it, as it may be made a
preliminary article of the peace, that it be secured, or at least the full
value of it, to the original owners.
Thus, with the battle lines between the two sides drawn by the House’s
mockery, the Senate adjourned for the winter, allowing the debate between
pro- and anti-confiscation ideologues to take place in the weekly Maryland
Gazette.22
Again, Charles Carroll of Carrollton set the stage for the initial debate,
writing in the Gazette as “A Senator” in the editions of February 11 and 18.
He picked up where he left off, arguing that the plan for confiscation was
murky and unlikely to enrich the state, especially if speculators could lock in
a price for purchase at auction but withhold actual payment while the country’s money depreciated in value. He also argued against the constitutionality
of property confiscation. For example, he appealed to the legal scholars
Grotius, Vattell, and others who argued that wars between nations allow for
the confiscation of another nation’s collective property, but not the individual
property of the opponent’s subjects, especially when those individuals had
committed no crimes. Carroll believed that the question of whether the
British were aliens had to be determined by the courts and not the legislature.
He inverted the logic of the famous Calvin’s Case, which held that Scottish
subjects born before the union with England remained aliens in England
after the union. In Maryland, therefore, because all were born British subjects
before Maryland’s independence, the British could not be made retroactive
aliens of the state after independence.23
The February 18 issue of the Gazette featured a letter supporting
Carroll. In the next week’s paper, “A Delegate” quipped, “The Senator
having occupied the Press, it will be impossible to answer him, until it
shall be vacant for that purpose. The public in the meantime will suspend
their judgment.” By late February, however, the tide already began to
turn. Multipage letters to the editor in support of confiscation began to
populate the Gazette’s pages. From February 11 to May 12, discussion of
confiscation dominated the newspaper, ultimately resulting in eighteen
letters supporting confiscation, nine opposing confiscation, and another
nine addressing confiscation without clearly supporting or supposing it,
either by reporting on political proceedings, or worrying about the tenor
of debate in the state. The topic’s popularity was such that several wags
published satirical pieces lampooning the debate itself and one another
without making serious points.24
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It is hard to reconstruct popular opinion from these pieces in the Gazette.
We cannot get a grasp on the authors of the debates: they themselves spent a
considerable amount of time questioning who was really writing. For example, it seems clear that at least three different authors wrote under the pseudonym of “A Plebean,” and those authors did not agree with one another on
all points. It could well be that the authors of the various letters represented
marginal opinions that the broad population did not share. However, the
large number of pieces supporting confiscation should give some indication that it had a significant base of support among the Gazette’s educated
readership. The tone of the letters in response to Carroll can also give a sense
of how common Marylanders felt about his reasoning. An early response to
Carroll expressed a sense of revolutionary outrage:
It is justly alarming to see principles like the Senator’s spread in a free
country, when two years ago, if any man had talked in that manner,
he would as soon have dared to put himself in the fire, or be tarred
and feathered, especially a member of our assembly; Good God, What
is this state come to, to be subjects of Great Britain? And we cannot
take the property of our enemies to pay our taxes, when, if it was in
their power they would take our lives.
Another author, aiming to recapitulate Carroll’s points in plain English,
wrote that the senator believed that “war may be carried on without money.”
A third, with Carroll’s discussion of Calvin’s Case in mind and referring to
the additional taxes that the state forced avowed loyalists to pay, wrote that
“the Senator has fully proved, that we are still British subjects. How then,
consistent with a good conscience, could any one take the oath of allegiance
to the state? On this ground the Senator may go on to show the iniquity of
the treble tax law.” A fourth satirist wrote:
Much scoff and scorn has been cast on a position of the Senator, that
a man may owe allegiance to two countries; and yet we hear of a snake
in New-England (according to the account of Cotton Mather, to the
royal society) which had two heads, and could run two ways at a time;
also of a negro in this state (according to the account of a gentleman,
to the same body) which was white and black, by turns; that is (not a
pye-bald negro, but) one who was white, one season of the year, and
black the other. Is it more extraordinary, that a man should be the
subject of two countries and inherit in both?
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Satire such as this can give us some insight into the common man’s resentments: of the British, of attempts to lighten the burden on public enemies
while the people suffered, and of the elite Senate’s interest in legal niceties
and shades of gray during a national emergency.25
In April 1780, with the message to the Senate that “our affairs are brought
to an alarming crisis,” the House of Delegates renewed its push for a confiscations bill. This bill was relatively straightforward, reiterating an argument
based on natural law that justified confiscation. The bill also contained a
provision that banned all quitrents to the British proprietor, Henry Harford.
The Senate endorsed banning quitrents but rejected the combined bill.26
When the Senate debated, their opposition focused on constitutional matters. In the words of Charles Carroll of Carrollton, Maryland’s “declaration
of rights secured all property acquired under the old government.” His father,
Charles Carroll of Annapolis, summed up the issue: “if British subjects are
aliens, they can’t hold property in this state; if they are not aliens, it would
be a breach of the constitution, to take their property from them.” Only
the courts could decide who was or was not an alien. He pointed out that
the state had not previously considered the proprietor Henry Harford an
alien, despite his continued residence in Britain, because they passed laws to
compensate him for taking his lands. Robert Goldsborough followed up by
questioning when British subjects lost their attachment to Maryland. What if
the absentees had left the state before the battles of Lexington and Concord,
or before the signing of the Declaration of Independence or Maryland’s
constitution in 1776? He asked, “Did they, by going away, infringe any law?
Their property was acquired legally; if they infringed no law, when they went
away, it would be an ex post facto law, and contrary to the declaration of
rights, to take their property away.” In part, this question revolved around
what made a citizen: in the words of Thomas Stone: “I don’t understand the
doctrine of election: what gives an election, but the having property in the
state?” Maryland as a state existed to protect its property holders, who made
up the electorate. The constitution elevated property holding such that only
the wealthiest men could fill the highest ranks of state office. As the senators
debated the issue, they realized that the act of confiscation amounted to a
radical redefinition of the citizenry.27
Basing further objections on practicalities, Goldsborough argued, “If we
cannot carry on the war without British property, our enemies will know it
and continue the war, and we must soon yield.” The younger Carroll also
objected on practical grounds, repeating his concern that “the treaty of peace
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Great-Britain would stipulate for the restoration of the property confiscated,
or a compensation for it,” such that holding onto any money received from
British subjects would prove illusory. Senator Thomas Stone considered
the possibility of confiscation but argued that the process could not be
conducted with undue haste: “It is time to interpose, not to steal a march
on them, but to give them notice to come and possess their property, or it
should be considered as derelict.”28
By this point in the spring of 1780, Stone and the other members of the
Senate had come to recognize the state’s dire financial position and the consequent need for confiscation, but constitutional questions still dominated
their thinking on the issue. Focusing on giving due notice to those potentially
affected, the Senate’s counterproposal mostly mirrored the House’s bill, but
defined British subjects as those who had left the state after August 14, 1775,
when Maryland had put itself on a formal defense footing against the British.
The Senate proposed alerting the nation’s generals and foreign ministers in
Europe so that they could alert anyone affected to return by May 1, 1781, to
reclaim Maryland citizenship and retain their property. British minors who
inherited Maryland estates could return by March 1786 to reclaim their inheritance. Seeing these overtures to the enemy as a bridge too far, the House did
not pass the Senate’s bill, leaving confiscation at an impasse.29
Outside events forced the senators’ hands. Within a few months, it
became apparent that the Maryland legislature could not draw on provincial
funds that the colonial legislature had invested for fifteen years, beginning
in 1764. This money had gone to purchase stocks controlled by the Bank of
England, which refused to release the investment to Maryland’s state treasurer. In addition, in Charleston, South Carolina, the British had begun a
campaign of arrests and property confiscations targeting local prominent citizens. This amounted to a pattern: British officials had signaled that they did
not share the Senate’s qualms about confiscation and specifically confiscated
Maryland’s money. The legislature needed no further debate; the final bill
for confiscation passed in November 1780. In the preamble the bill’s authors
included a justification linked explicitly to Britain’s recent actions:
Whereas the subjects of Great-Britain possess considerable landed
and other property in this state, which the legislature, from a disinclination to distress individuals, hath suffered to remain in the hands
and management of their agents, hoping that a conduct so moderate
would induce the enemy to respect the rights of humanity, emulate
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the example, and alleviate the calamities of war; but such lenity and
forbearance, instead of meeting with a proper return, have been falsely
imputed to pusillanimity and a dread of retaliation, and seem rather
to have encouraged the enemy to acts of violence and cruelty.
This passage neatly summarizes the Senate’s about-face: the British compelled them to no longer entertain constitutional arguments or “alleviate the
calamities of war.”30
For senators who had long grappled with the constitutionality of depriving anyone of their property, the law amounted to a radical redefinition
of subjecthood. For the purposes of the law, any man born within British
dominions was British,
unless he hath, by some subsequent act, divested himself of that relation, by adhering to us and our cause, as by entering in to the service
or employment of the United States, or any of them, joining in the
formation of our government, taking the oath of allegiance to it, withdrawing himself from the British dominions for his attachment to the
United States, or by doing some similar open act.
The law took a further step, banning any “payments or remittances whatsoever” to any British person, except for parents educating their children in
British dominions. They were to continue these payments only for as long as
it took to relocate the children elsewhere. In April, senators had questioned
what it meant to be a voter in Maryland, since the main requirement was
holding property in the state. Now, the residents of Maryland had to prove
their allegiance to the revolution, or else remain British: passive subjecthood
would need to give way to active citizenship.31
Nevertheless, the Senate had not fully abandoned its previous efforts
to protect property holding. British subjects still had a year to return to
Maryland to reclaim their property and voting rights, although the state
would not make any efforts to notify them of their deadlines. In addition,
American creditors of British subjects would receive their debts before the
state could make use of the properties. The law was vague on this point,
however, noting that “the indemnification of sufferers shall be settled by
the general assembly, and if agreed to is not to exceed the value of British
property made use of by this state.” Despite bowing to the circumstances of
the war, and despite the radical reformulation of the state’s relationship with
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Britain and its own citizens, the Senate remained committed to upholding
property rights and the rights of creditors.32

executing the confiscations
In 1781 Maryland established a three-man commission to oversee the confiscations, appointing Colonel Uriah Forrest, William Paca, and Clement
Hollyday as the first three commissioners. Forrest and Paca quickly resigned
and were replaced by Gabriel Duvall and Colonel Nathaniel Ramsey. Except
for Hollyday, all the commissioners were well-known figures in Maryland
politics. Forrest left military service in 1781 and occupied a seat in Maryland’s
House that year, eventually serving on both the state Senate and Executive
Council. Paca was a legislator in both Maryland’s House and Senate and
became governor in 1782. In addition to his military service, Ramsey was a
delegate to the state’s conventions in 1775 and later elected to the legislature
in 1789. Duvall served as the clerk for many of the state’s conventions, the
state Council of Safety, and the House of Delegates. In 1782 he joined the
Executive Council, forcing him to temporarily resign from the commission,
although he soon returned and continued to conduct commission business
until 1785. The less prominent Hollyday relocated to Annapolis to focus on
dispatching the commission’s business full-time. Meanwhile, over the next
few years the legislature began to enact a series of updated laws to further
regulate confiscations, including a provision to enable tenants pre-emptive
rights to buy the land that they had leased in the colonial period at slightly
reduced rates.33
Beginning in 1782 Maryland appointed its intendant of the revenue,
Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, to oversee the state’s funds. He began working closely with the commissioners of confiscated property and began
directing many of the confiscations himself in 1784. By this time, the commission had already auctioned off much of the British property, although
numerous headaches remained for Jenifer to address. Foremost among
these were many purchasers who had failed to pay in full had also failed
to post bond on their remaining balances. By 1785 Maryland had entered
a recession, putting enormous pressure on Jenifer, who was left with the
unenviable task of handling the budget for a state that had spent profligately for the last decade. This led to considerable tension between Jenifer
and the commissioners.34
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Despite having a difficult job, the commissioners accomplished the confiscations with relatively little scandal. At a typical confiscation, commissioners
had to assess an estate’s assets and determine the extent to which creditors
should receive the proceeds of sales before the state. They would also oversee surveys of properties and advertise and conduct auctions. A variety of
problems could interfere with the speedy execution of confiscations. Rival
claimants could protest sales, claiming ownership over confiscated property.
In some instances, tenants who occupied confiscated lands refused to vacate
them upon sale; in another example, French soldiers commandeered confiscated lands, making them temporarily useless to the purchaser who therefore
refused to pay for them. Purchasers tried to return unwanted lands or bargain
their way out of making a proportion of their down payments in specie. Soon
after the sales began in 1782, the intendant of the revenue requested the postponement of sales until enough specie was available at large for the public to
make proper down payments at auction.35
The best insight into the difficulties the commission underwent comes
from an extended, ugly exchange that took place from October 1786 to June
1787 between the commissioners and the intendant of the revenue, Daniel
of St. Thomas Jenifer. Once again, long after the principal business of confiscation was over, the issue dominated the Maryland Gazette’s front pages,
as the two groups sent accusatory letters to one another through the press.
These began with Gabriel Duvall responding angrily to an earlier letter then
circulating in Cecil County in which Jenifer claimed that the commissioners
had attempted to remove him from his position as intendant and had tried
to avoid his examination of their records. Several allegations of improper
behavior stood out although criminal charges were never in question. Jenifer
accused the commissioners of mishandling various surveys, auctions, and
bonds, which resulted in the defrauding of purchasers and the state to the
benefit of the commissioners. Duvall and the other commissioners denied
this, arguing that their auctions raised particularly high prices for the land
in question, especially in comparison to the sales Jenifer oversaw, and that
any irregularities were due to the dire need to raise quick funds for the
government.36
Particular confusion beset the early sales at Nanticoke Manor on the
Eastern Shore. The commissioners had concentrated on the Western Shore,
where most confiscations took place, leaving Nanticoke unsurveyed before
auctioning off its lands. Numerous purchasers (including the commissioner
Clement Hollyday) demanded their money back after the surveys, upon
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receiving lands they had not intended to buy. As intendant, Jenifer ordered
general resales at Nanticoke. The commissioners claimed that many of those
demanding their money back merely had buyer’s remorse for paying high
prices at the initial auction. As a result, the commissioners expected to be
paid their 2.5 percent commission on both the initial sales and the resales.
This question of commissions became a key aspect of the conflict between
the intendant and the commissioners. Jenifer resented the commissioners’
high payments, especially given that he received the lesser commission of
1.5 percent on sales that he conducted. He felt that the state overvalued the
commissioners’ work. Instead, they should have always received payment in
devalued paper money rather than specie, given their high commissions.37
The public letters revealed a variety of other irregular practices, which
did not rise to the level of criminal fraud but point to the opportunity for
official corruption inherent in confiscations. At public auctions, the commissioners should have demanded bonds of the successful bidders so that
the state would be guaranteed payment. Otherwise, commissioners might
receive commissions on sales for which the state would not receive full payment. They were often incapable of making buyers post bonds, while Jenifer
had much less trouble once he took over the remainder of the sales in 1784.
In a variety of cases the intendant ordered private sales, rather than auctions,
for confiscated estates. Duvall alleged that some of these private sales raised
far less money than an auction would have, meaning that well-placed friends
of Jenifer could benefit at the state’s expense. Defending the commissioners, Duvall argued that Jenifer was able to enforce bonds because his sales
brought in so little money for the state: “When a man can purchase property
for an half, a fourth, or a tenth of its real value, he will not hesitate to comply
with the terms of sale.” Nonetheless, neither Jenifer nor Duvall could present
a convincing public case that any buyers received lands at cut rates.38
On at least one occasion, Commissioner Ramsey subverted a regulation
that was meant to avoid the auctions being manipulated for the commissioners’ benefit. He used an undeclared proxy buyer to purchase lands for himself,
to avoid an early injunction (which was later relaxed) against commissioners
purchasing lands directly. In another instance, an alleged purchaser of lands,
Stephen Steward, denied having ever bid for certain lots, suggesting that the
commissioners were trying to receive commissions on lands for which the
government would receive no payment. These allegations were troubling
but did not rise to the level of involving either the legislature or the criminal
justice system. The general pattern of sales and the accusations of the officials
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involved suggest that the process of confiscation was inherently messy, especially given the state’s dire financial situation, which put pressure on officials
to make quick sales.39
While outright corruption was not prevalent, the Maryland government
executed confiscation in a way that reflected its elitism. Maryland sold over
200,000 acres owned by loyalists for nearly half a million pounds, breaking
up a variety of large estates in the process. Philip Crowl sought to test the
widely held proposition that these confiscations tended to democratically
redistribute property. This idea rested in part on the assumption that former
tenants took advantage of laws allowing them to purchase the lands confiscated from their landlords, the loyalist manor holders. Crowl found that
the actual sale of loyalist properties produced mixed results: in places like
Baltimore, where property values were high, and the properties sold were
often merchants’ wharfs and warehouses, only the well-to-do could afford to
buy much property. In the countryside the distribution of lands was more
equitable, averaging 184 acres per purchase. Crowl argued that these sales did
result in a more democratic distribution of the land, even if relatively few
purchasers benefitted, because the sales broke up very large estates. However,
these average purchases still dwarfed the fifty-acre titles that the government
granted in Washington County to veterans (which would guarantee voting
rights).40
Jackson Turner Main investigated the social effects of property confiscation, generally concurring with Crowl’s observations. He pointed out that
merchants, lawyers, and several prominent legislators, including Samuel
Chase, Luther Martin, Daniel Carroll, and William Paca, purchased much
of the valuable property sold in Baltimore. Main further noted that few tenants on proprietary lands could afford to buy the lands where they lived,
despite laws allowing them to buy it at a 10 percent price reduction. Main
suggested that a real democratization in land holding primarily occurred
after the initial speculators defaulted on their payments or sold the land they
purchased at auction. However, Gregory Stiverson’s examination of tenants’
fates contrasted with Main’s findings. Looking at a variety of proprietary
manorial estates in which tenants held cheap long-term leases, he found
that by the time patentees received quiet possession of confiscated lands,
they held more acreage on average than the tenants had. In the case of one
estate in Queen Anne’s County, patentees held average farms of nearly 360
acres in size, whereas tenants had farmed on average holdings of 113 acres.
There, Commissioner Gabriel Duvall was particularly active as a speculator,
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purchasing eight lots for himself and his business associates. He resold those
lots within two years, in some cases to former tenants. Only in some lands of
poor quality on the western shore were tenants able to buy their own lands
directly after confiscation. For the rest, confiscation amounted to a destabilization of their lives.41
A detailed analysis of Maryland’s sales of confiscated property shows that
government officials, especially legislators, on average bought substantially
larger amounts of property than other civilians did. In total, 785 separate
buyers made valid purchases of confiscated property from 1781 to 1784, the
period affected by the original confiscation law of early 1781. Of these, 68
percent were neither military officers nor legislators, while 21 percent were
military officers during the revolution, 3 percent were politicians during the
colonial or early national era, and a further 7 percent were both officers and
politicians.42
Although nonofficials accounted for nearly 70 percent of the purchasers,
their purchases were far smaller than those by officials. On average, nonofficials bought £424 of property per purchaser. Military officers bought twice
that amount, at £843 of property per purchaser. Legislators bought nearly
three times as much per purchaser, at £1,266 each, and men who were both
officers and legislators bought roughly five and a half times as much property
as nonofficials, at an average of £2,330 per purchaser. A similar pattern held
for other types of confiscated property. For example, although nonofficials
bought 184 rural acres per purchaser on average, military officers bought
nearly twice as many, and politicians bought nearly three times as many acres
as nonofficials. Officials also tended to finance other purchasers’ payments
at much higher rates, paid greater amounts of interest, and bought more
expensive urban property.
In general, nonofficials bought less than military officers, who bought less
than politicians, while individuals who served as both officers and politicians
bought the most confiscated property. Among the officers, militia officers tended to buy slightly less property than those who had served in the
Continental Army, suggesting that Continental officers came from a higher
stratum of society. These patterns mirror the distribution of officers within
Maryland, with high property requirements making service in the legislature
an exclusive club. In the Maryland militia soldiers elected their officers and
occasionally elected men of lower status, including some who could not meet
the property qualifications for voting. This may partially explain the discrepancy in total purchases between militia and army officers.43
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The evidence also indicates that men who served in both the military
and political fields tended to buy larger amounts of property. This suggests
a correlation between office and opportunity, whereby wealthier men filled
the positions of power in both the military and politics. It also suggests that
men who tapped into multiple social networks cultivated greater opportunities for financial gain.
It is unreasonable to believe that Maryland’s legislators decided to confiscate property based strictly out of self-interest. Norman K. Risjord noted
that only 25 percent of Maryland’s legislators speculated in confiscated
property, and less than 20 percent of Maryland’s legislators engaged in
large-scale speculations during the 1780s. Many who did voted against their
personal economic interests, opposing debt relief and easy credit. Legislators
also made a token effort to benefit tenants on confiscated lands. However,
Maryland’s elites controlled its government, so it should not surprise us that
confiscations tended to put large properties in the hands of those elites.
Corruption in this case was not overt, but it was systemic: the wealthy were
the men best positioned to benefit from any opportunity for investment or
speculation and most likely to comprise the state’s leadership. Having gained
control, Maryland’s leaders did not conduct the revolution to level social
differences: they sought to protect private property whenever possible and
had little interest in democratizing wealth beyond the necessity of avoiding
popular revolt.44

placing maryland’s confiscations in context
Pennsylvania’s and Maryland’s confiscations make for a strong comparative
case study. While both were proprietary colonies, they had significant differences in their economies, the radicalness of their early politics, and the
degree to which the British and loyalists harassed revolutionaries during
the war. They also differed in the amount of western land they retained
after the revolution: Pennsylvania still had access to millions of acres of the
backcountry, while Maryland did not. Despite these differences, both states
ultimately endorsed confiscation as a means for raising money and, in both
states, prominent men came to dominate those purchases.
As the revolution began, Pennsylvania and Maryland took alternate political trajectories. Pennsylvania produced the most radical constitution of any
rebelling state. Colonial Pennsylvania had required voters to possess fifty
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acres of land or £50 of cash. Pennsylvania’s revolutionary constitution of
1776 did away with this barrier to voting: instead, a white man could vote
if he was twenty-one or older, had lived in Pennsylvania for at least a year,
and had paid taxes during that time. This meant that perhaps 90 percent
of Philadelphians and 75 percent of men in the countryside could vote, an
increase over the percentage of the populace that would have met the colonial property requirements, which might have been as low as 50 percent. In
addition, the constitution created a single-chamber legislature whose members could not serve consecutive years, a president without veto power, and
a Council of Censors to review the government’s operation. To encourage
public feedback, the government published bills before passing them, pledging not to propose and pass bills in the same session, so that the people could
consider them first. To encourage financial equality, the government passed
progressive taxes, penalizing land speculators.45
Both Pennsylvania’s radical government and its military situation differentiated it from Maryland. After the fall of New York in 1776, British general
William Howe turned his attention to Philadelphia, eventually capturing
the city in September 1777. The Continental Congress evacuated the city,
fleeing into the backcountry to Lancaster and eventually York. While a sizeable number of potential loyalist activists stood ready to help the British, the
regular army made little effort to arm them and soon evacuated the city in
June 1778. While Maryland enjoyed relative safety, Pennsylvania remained in
upheaval for years.46
Given the tumult that came with this occupation, the Pennsylvania
legislature was quick to pass laws to condemn loyalists for treason. These
laws soon gave way to acts of confiscation. In 1776 the Pennsylvania state
constitutional convention passed an ordinance allowing property confiscations for treason. However, because the convention had no legislative
authority, no loyalists forfeited property under this ordinance. In February
1777 the Pennsylvania legislature passed a law allowing confiscation of moveable property as punishment for treason. While Howe campaigned around
Philadelphia later in 1777, previously passive loyalists began to demonstrate
their support for the British. In response, a branch of the Pennsylvania
Assembly, the Council of Safety, began authorizing confiscations and sales of
loyalist property (including real estate) without trial in February 1778, almost
three years before Maryland. The state sold about a dozen properties in this
manner, mostly in the patriot-controlled backcountry. In March 1778, with
the British in occupation of Philadelphia, the legislature officially allowed the
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confiscation of real estate, specifically targeting thirteen notorious loyalists
for treason trials. Legislators primarily aimed this law at loyalists who had left
the state. Selling their property would alleviate the state’s tax burden. These
sales coincided with treason trials, which began after the British abandonment of Philadelphia.47
Pennsylvanians who failed to report to treason trials received a mandatory
death sentence, although in practice few executions occurred. In all, the state
accused about 500 hundred citizens of treason. Of the 113 who reported for
their trials, only 17 underwent an actual trial. Of these, only 2 were convicted
and executed, forfeiting their property. The state also confiscated the property of 118 other loyalists who refused to report for trial, thus intertwining
confiscation with treason. Land sales began in August 1779 and continued
slowly for many years. The state used the money to shore up its finances,
allotting some of the proceeds from the sale specifically to fund the university
in Philadelphia and recompense soldiers whom the state had paid in depreciated currency.48
Because the end of the war was economically turbulent, many
Pennsylvanians sought to cheat the state through the process of acquiring
confiscated lands. Pennsylvanians’ dishonest dealings resembled those in
Maryland but took place on a grander scale. For example, in 1780 the state
reconfiscated lands sold to purchasers in Northampton County. Taking
advantage of the rapid depreciation of the currency, purchasers there sought
to delay payment for their lands to gain the lands at a lower real price. In
Bucks County accusations of intimidation at auctions emerged, indicating
that prices could be kept low to benefit buyers at the expense of the state.
Throughout the state, officials made little effort to meticulously record
property sales, and much of the land appears to have fallen into the hands of
a small number of well-connected men. In 1780 the government prosecuted
Thomas Hale, the agent overseeing land confiscations in Philadelphia
County, for fraud. His books showed a shortfall of £50,000.49
Wealthy Pennsylvanians, including prominent merchants, speculated in
depreciation certificates, which could be used to purchase confiscated lands.
The state government had originally issued these certificates to soldiers who
had received depreciated pay as a means to guarantee them a fair form of
compensation. Using the certificates, speculators might purchase lands under
assumed names. For example, in 1786 in Bucks County, Nicolas Brosius
bought property using the depreciation certificates issued to thirty different
soldiers. In other examples, state officials overseeing land sales took part in
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the bidding. Of 196 buyers, 52 were army officers, 4 were legislators, and 1
was the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, Thomas McKean. An additional 17
purchasers worked for the state bureaucracy in some capacity, most having
something to do with overseeing state funds or the forfeited estates.50
Throughout the 1780s Pennsylvania’s confiscated estates remained a political football. In October 1780 conservative Republicans won state elections
in Pennsylvania, forcing through a bill to settle soldiers’ pay. In part, the
government would produce the money through sales of confiscated lands.
Radicals opposed the bill, including the allocations of sales from confiscated
lands, fearing that a well-paid army might come to dominate political affairs.
However, radicals certainly did not want to put a stop to the land sales: they
also accused conservatives of wanting to return the Penn family to the state
and restore confiscated property to returning loyalists. In another example,
the state’s Council of Censors set aside forty-five confiscated estates for the
old College of Philadelphia. Disliking the direction of the college, which had
been taken over by the radical state assembly in 1779, and arguing that the
college received more income from the confiscated properties than expected,
conservative Republicans in the legislature chose to allow only two-thirds of
these reserved estates as endowments for the college in 1784. The next year,
when radical constitutionalists regained political control, they reassigned these
estates to the college. In the late 1780s conservative Republicans campaigned
in part on the position that radicals had squandered the state’s confiscated
property. However, when conservatives ultimately came to power in 1790,
the confiscations were no longer a hot-button issue. Pennsylvania’s political
oscillations stood in contrast to Maryland, where the more stable power of
conservatives like Charles Carroll of Carrollton had delayed confiscation for
years but also eliminated backtracking after the initiation of the policy.51
New Jersey’s overtly corrupt confiscations resembled those in Pennsylvania.
The war raged in that state early, and confiscations began there in August
1777. New Jersey’s commissioners took particular advantage of the chaos
caused by the war. Because the currency was in a state of freefall, the commissioners held on to the specie they received personally, delaying their payments
to the state, effectively paying in dollars worth far less than they received.
In Governor Livingston’s words, they “plundered us of thousands by trading with the money, or converting it into real estate, and afterwards paying
us at a great depreciation.” The state’s attorney general, William Paterson,
estimated the commissioners’ dishonesty cost New Jersey $300,000. In other
cases commissioners manipulated auctions to secure sales for their friends,
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either by limiting bidding or by holding sales very early in the day. Elsewhere,
local loyalists would arrange for friendly transfers of property to their patriot
neighbors, thereby avoiding confiscation altogether. In 1781, the year that
Maryland’s confiscations began, New Jersey’s governor halted land sales, arguing that the state’s commissioners had defrauded the public. As elsewhere, the
process of auctions did not break up big estates to make way for smallholders.
Tenants received no pre-emption rights to buy the lands where they lived.
Wealthy men purchased much of the confiscated land cheaply.52
This pattern, in which the wealthy benefited and confiscations had
little social impact, held in most places throughout the United States. In
Massachusetts the proceeds from confiscations in Suffolk County went
primarily to private creditors to whom loyalists had owed debts. Because
sales had to be paid in cash, which was scarce, many men could not
participate in the sales, which caused grumbling among soldiers paid in
certificates. The confiscated lands themselves went primarily to men who
already owned land. In Virginia most of the 53,000 confiscated acres sold
had previously belonged to British merchants; those acres passed primarily into the hands of the gentry. Similarly, in Georgia, confiscation did
not significantly redistribute landholdings, and the Georgia government
sought to forgive several prominent loyalists in the hopes of improving the
postwar economy.53
Regarding redistribution, war-torn New York stood apart from other
states. In colonial New York enormous estates were common and tenancy was endemic. Drawing on the social conflicts that predated the
revolution, confiscations broke up loyalist manors to the benefit of their
pro-revolutionary tenants, causing a democratization of landholding. For
example, in Philipse Manor, confiscation broke up a single 50,000-acre estate
into 287 landholdings; 194 of the new owners had previously been tenants.
John T. Reilly estimated that more than 70 percent of the purchasers of
confiscated lands came from the lower classes and “that between one-quarter
and one-third of the state’s one million improved acres changed hands in the
direction of a wider distribution of landownership.” Confiscations, along
with generous redistributions of moveable property to the needy, cemented
revolutionary support in New York as a whole and tended to level society in
a way that they did not elsewhere. However, even in New York, land policy
still reflected the state’s hierarchical power structure. As one might expect,
many speculators purchased confiscated estates alongside tenants, and
large estates held by patriots were not broken up for similar redistribution.
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By 1784 desirous of speculators’ money to raise funds, the state removed its
500-acre limit on land purchases, thereby reversing its democratic approach
to confiscated land.54
A few generalizations unite Maryland’s experience of confiscation with that
of other states. Despite sporadic political opposition, the need for confiscation became apparent across the United States. Corruption attended all of the
confiscations, but its scale varied with time. States under greater duress tended
to embrace confiscation more rapidly, and their confiscations coincided with
extreme inflation, exacerbating the opportunities for corruption. This was particularly the case in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Elsewhere, such as in New
York, or on a very small scale in Maryland, states sought to directly benefit
impoverished patriotic tenants. Usually, politicians subordinated support for
the poor to the need to acquire cash quickly and the direct beneficiaries of confiscations were wealthy creditors and speculators. However, the scale of these
speculations would soon be dwarfed by the land dealings of the late 1780s and
1790s. Once the barriers to trans-Appalachian settlement opened after the war,
a variety of grand speculators and land companies purchased millions of acres
at a time, leaving many common farmers landless. In Pennsylvania speculators
came to control perhaps 80 percent of the backcountry lands opened after the
revolution. Further south, most settlers that moved into southwestern Virginia
and Kentucky during the 1790s remained landless. The speculation in confiscated estates presaged how much the post-revolutionary land market would tip
in favor of speculators but did so on a far smaller scale.55
It is indeed worth noting that small states without western land, like
Maryland and New Jersey, turned to confiscation with relative avidity. During
the revolution, states like Georgia, which made relatively modest confiscations, still claimed immense lands in the west. Although it did not claim
lands in the far west, Pennsylvania could claim millions of trans-Appalachian
acres that could be put on sale following the war. Its officials chose not to
bother with casting a wider net for loyalist properties that would be unlikely
to sell quickly at auction. As a result, most of Pennsylvania’s confiscated lands
lay in Philadelphia County, where land prices remained highest. In contrast,
by the time of the revolution, Maryland had all but exhausted its supply of
land. Lacking any obvious means of raising revenue quickly, once the state
government decided to authorize confiscations, it needed to press for the
sales of as many loyalist properties as possible. This could account for why
Maryland sold around 150,000 more acres of confiscated land than its larger
neighbors, Pennsylvania and Virginia.56
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As expected, when the Revolutionary War ended, Britain’s peace agreement with the United States stipulated that the Americans should return the
loyalists’ confiscated property. Nevertheless, only a small minority, including a number of wives and family members who petitioned for relief, ever
received any of their property back. In the colonies as a whole, about 60,000
loyalists fled the mainland. Of these, more than 5,000 filed statements with
the British government respecting lost property. Of those people, a little over
2,000 received payment from the British government, totaling approximately
30 percent of their estimated property losses.57
Once the crisis of the war ended, the nation’s political leaders came to
regret revolutionary-era confiscations, enshrining a ban on bills of attainder
in section 9 of Article I of the Constitution. In the mid-1780s a sea change
occurred: whereas every state had seen property confiscation as desirable, the
country now considered it unconstitutional, much as Charles Carroll and his
fellow Maryland senators once did. This raises the question of what confiscation meant to citizenship during the revolutionary period. In 1788 individual
property rights had to be respected: why not before? Whereas Maryland,
and the English-speaking world, had always tied subjecthood to property
ownership, the chaos of the revolution made that position untenable, at least
temporarily. If confiscation were to be constitutional, subjects had to become
citizens: voluntary adherents to the revolutionary cause. Maryland’s senators
came to this position out of financial exigency and practical necessity; British
confiscations of American traitors’ property gave them no choice. Beyond
this, confiscation had offered the possibility of radically redistributing wealth
in the country. The Maryland government did not consider this possibility:
it was not politically necessary (in contrast with New York) and Maryland’s
elites had always worried about the threat of mob rule. Indeed, as Carroll
had predicted, the confiscated lands ended up in the hands of “engrossers
and speculators.” In many cases these were the same men who led the state
in revolution. This outcome should not surprise us: Maryland’s elites had
already arranged its state constitution to ensure that control of both houses
of the legislature were in the hands of the men who had the wherewithal to
speculate during the revolutionary crisis.58
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